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225 Response  
Enactivism, Cognitive Science, and the Jonasian 
Inference  
Dave Ward and Mario Villalobos 
 
1. We are very grateful for this insightful set of commentaries, and thank the authors 
for taking the time to address some of the issues raised in our target article. Many of the 
responses are contributions to exactly the kind of conversation within and around the 
enactive community we hoped our article would start; one that aims at clarifying the 
complicated set of relationships between the theoretical and methodological 
commitments of enactivism, phenomenology, and cognitive science. Reading the 
commentaries together also suggests that, at a couple of crucial stages, we could have 
presented ideas of our target article more clearly, and we are thankful for the 
opportunity to try to do that here. 
2. What are the points we wanted to make in the target article? Put briefly, we 
intended to claim that,  
 at least since Andreas Weber and Francisco Varela (2002), enactivism has 
incorporated a theoretical commitment to aspects of Hans Jonas’s philosophical 
biology;  
 Jonas’s philosophical biology is theoretically committed to an anthropomorphism 
which is at odds with the methodological commitments of modern science;  
 there is thus a tension that needs to be addressed between enactivism’s 
commitment to Jonas’s philosophical biology and its aspirations towards becoming 
a new scientific paradigm.  
In the second half of the article we used ideas from Humberto Maturana’s autopoietic 
theory (MAT) to provide an example of an alternative way we might construe the 
relationship between cognitive science and the lived experience of human and non-
human. 
3. Though some commentaries (Maturana and Shigeru Taguchi) raised helpful 
comments and questions about the part of our target article concerning MAT, this will 
not be the main focus of our reply. We think we can express the most common themes 
raised by the commentaries in terms of three questions:  
 What is anthropomorphism?  
 Is it something to which enactivism is really committed?  
 Why should it be understood as incompatible with the scientific study of nature?  
We will use this reply to say something about each of these crucial questions for our 
target article in turn. 
What is anthropomorphism? 
4. Clearly, we left ample room for readers to wonder exactly what anthropomorphism 
refers to in our target article. Is it, Paulo De Jesus asks, the attribution of any mentality 
to nonhuman entities (see also Jean-Luc Petit’s commentary), or only the attribution of 
human-like mentality to those entities? Are the problems we see for anthropomorphism 
still problems for a modern anthropomorphism, as proposed by Peter Gaitsch? Or for 
the zoomorphism in terms of which (as Steve Torrance points out) Jonas sometimes 
characterises his own position?  
5. The main objective of our target article is to highlight a tension between the 
theoretical commitments of enactivism and the methodological commitments of modern 
science. Given this purpose, what matters for whether a methodology, theory or 
argument is anthropomorphic in our terms is not the range of properties attributed to 
non-human entities, but rather the way in which our attribution of mental properties is 
grounded. The aspect of Jonas’s philosophical biology we find problematic is (as 
Taguchi discerns) what we call the Jonasian Inference (henceforth “JI”). This is the 
inference involved when we “take the presence of purposive inwardness in one part of 
the physical order, viz., in man, as a valid testimony to the nature of that wider reality 
that lets it emerge” (Jonas 1966: 37). In simple terms, we infer from our first-person 
experience of teleology that we can take the appearance of teleology in other living 
organisms at face value. 
6. In a chapter of The Phenomenon of Life where Jonas is discussing the 
incompatibility of modern science (Jonas 1966: 72–74) with understanding metabolism 
as entailing self-perpetuating unities imbued with “needful freedom” (ibid: 80), he 
asserts that the “[o]rganic identity” of a living organism must be different from the 
tautologous identity of bits of inert matter with themselves. He asks: 
“But what kind of inference is this? And by whom? How can the unprepared observer infer what 
no mere analysis of the physical record will ever yield? The unprepared observer cannot […] The 
observer of life must be prepared by life. In other words, organic existence with its own 
experience is required of himself for his being able to make that inference […]” (Jonas 1966: 82) 
This is the sense of Jonas’s claim that life can only be known by life – “happening to be 
living material things ourselves, we have in our self-experience, as it were, peepholes 
into the inwardness of [organic] substance […]” (ibid: 91). We might – perhaps should 
– have written our target article without reference to anthropomorphism, focusing only 
on the problematic status of JI, and left its central claims intact. 
7. In a moment we will say more about the role of JI in contemporary enactivism, and 
the tension between JI and modern science. Before doing so, let us note that making the 
role of JI explicit allows us to respond to several of the questions about 
anthropomorphism raised by the commentators. To De Jesus’s question of whether our 
concern is with the attribution of human-like mentality or any mentality to non-human 
entities, we can answer: it depends. JI is most likely to be employed in grounding 
attributions of human-like mentality, but the questions our target article attempts to 
raise apply to any attribution of mental properties grounded in JI. The compatibility of 
the modern anthropomorphism proposed by Gaitsch with modern science depends on 
whether such an anthropomorphism avails itself of JI. Finally, Torrance is right to note 
that Jonas was motivated precisely by a concern to avoid anthropocentrism in our 
conception of mind, and thus sometimes speaks of zoomorphism instead of 
anthropomorphism. But such a zoomorphism is equally problematic insofar as its 
attribution of mental properties is grounded in JI. 
Enactivism and the Jonasian Inference 
8. In the next section we try to clarify why we find a tension between a commitment 
to JI and an aspiration to become a new scientific paradigm. But is it actually the case 
that enactivism grounds its attributions of mentality in JI? Rasmus Gahrn-Anderson 
& Matthew Harvey rightly note that contemporary enactivists argue that the roots of 
mentality are to be located in dynamic organisational properties such as autopoiesis, 
autonomy, and adaptivity. Does enactivism not attempt to legitimate its attributions of 
mental properties via appeal to these features, rather than via JI? Jérôme Proulx finds 
no such commitment in his own enactivist work on mathematical cognition, nor in the 
related work of his colleagues.  
9. However, contra Gahrn-Anderson & Harvey, we think that the commitment to a 
deep continuity between life and mind that is characteristic of much contemporary 
enactivism is more often motivated by JI than by a belief that reductive explanation of 
teleological phenomena in terms of autopoietic or adaptive dynamics has been provided. 
To repeat a quote from our target article, consider Weber and Varela’s claim that: 
“[B]efore being scientists we are first living beings, and as such we have evidence of our intrinsic 
teleology in us. And, in observing other creatures struggling to continue their existence – starting 
from simple bacteria that actively swim away from a chemical repellent – we can, by our own 
evidence, understand teleology as the governing force of the realm of the living.” (Weber & 
Varela 2002: 110, emphasis added) 
Here, and in the rest of Weber and Varela’s paper, a teleological understanding of living 
systems is grounded in the evidence of our own experience, via JI, and it is only in light 
of this phenomenological evidence that autopoietic or adaptive dynamics present 
themselves as plausible dynamical underpinnings of teleological properties. Similarly, 
Evan Thompson holds that: 
“[T]he theory of autopoiesis provides a naturalistic interpretation of the teleological conception of 
life originating in experience, but our experience of our own bodily being is a condition of 
possibility for our comprehension of autopoietic selfhood.” (Thompson 2007: 164, emphasis 
added) 
And in Ezequiel Di Paolo’s influential paper “Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, 
agency” he departs from Weber and Varela (2002) in arguing that enactivists should 
ground teleology in adaptive rather than autopoietic dynamics, while sharing their 
commitment to JI: 
“[T]he attribution of teleology to metabolism is justified partly by means of intuition outside 
scientific discourse. Jonas implicitly admits that establishing in metabolism the breaking point 
between extended neutral processes and concernful identity is a matter of appropriate choice. 
How are we to justify this and further choices, or question their sufficiency, when the criteria of 
validation are, at least partly, outside science? The answer must be: by the use of 
phenomenological insight or other disciplined intuitions.” (Di Paolo 2005: 431f) 
10. Each of these quotes make clear that, at least for these canonical enactivist 
thinkers, JI is called upon to do important work before autopoietic or adaptive dynamics 
can appear as candidate explanations of teleological properties. Might enactivists 
dispense with JI and attempt a straightforward reductive explanation of teleological 
properties in terms of dynamical organisation? This question deserves more discussion 
than we can provide here. But a common theme in recent work on enactivism is the 
provision of arguments that autopoietic or adaptive dynamics are ill-suited to this 
explanatory role (see, e.g., Villalobos & Ward 2015; De Jesus 2016; Barrett 2015; 
Barandiaran 2016).  
11. Philosophers of mind and cognition have spent much of the past five decades 
attempting to explain teleological properties of our mental states in terms of structural, 
functional or dynamical properties. It is fair to say that the consensus is that these 
attempts have yet to succeed, and it is not clear how adaptive or autopoietic accounts 
can help with the problems they have faced – for example, how can an account in terms 
of structure, function or dynamics adequately specify success conditions for teleological 
states? How can such an account accommodate the normativity that separates the 
genuinely teleological character of some mental states from a mere covariation relation 
between a state of an organism and a state in the world? It may be that the conceptual 
apparatus already at the disposal of enactivists can yield satisfactory responses to 
questions such as these – but further work is required to show this. For the enactivist 
authors quoted above, however, these questions are misplaced. None of these authors 
aim at the reductive explanatory goal of showing how teleology emerges from non-
teleological properties of structure, function or dynamics. Instead, via JI, they argue that 
we should understand particular forms of dynamical organisation as imbued with 
immanent teleology. We think it is fair to say that these authors have set the research 
agenda for most contemporary enactivist work. Might enactivism nonetheless dispense 
with JI? We will return to this question below. But now that we have clarified our 
conception of JI and the use enactivism makes of it, we can say more about its 
problematic relationship with modern science. 
Cognitive science and the Jonasian Inference 
12. Several commentators (De Jesus, Gaitsch, Petit, Torrance) raise questions about 
why employing JI should be understood as incompatible with the scientific study of 
nature, and others (Maturana, Taguchi) suggest specific ways in which the 
relationship between phenomenology and science might be understood which go 
beyond the discussion of our target article. Hopefully the above clarifications about the 
role of JI in our argument and in enactivism already suggest responses to some of these 
questions. For example, in response to Petit (and to parts of the commentaries of De 
Jesus and Torrance) it should now be clear that our concern in our target article is not 
with the attribution of teleological properties to nonhuman organisms tout court, but 
with grounding that attribution in JI. 
13. So, just what is the incompatibility we see between the methodological 
commitments of modern science and a commitment to JI? In our target article we 
mainly rely on pointing towards Jonas’s own case for this incompatibility – one reason 
for this is to encourage enactivists who make use of Jonas’s work to address this issue. 
If we take Jonas’s work seriously enough to absorb a commitment to JI from it, then 
they should also engage with the parts of Jonas’s work dealing with the tension between 
endorsing immanent teleology on the basis of JI and modern science. Another reason 
for our relying on Jonas for this purpose is simply that specifying the methodological 
commitments of modern science is a difficult task – perhaps an impossible one, due to 
the heterogeneity of the research programmes we are willing to classify as scientific. 
One response to this difficulty is to meet it head on, by engaging in the kind of 
reflection on scientific method found in Maturana’s interesting commentary. However, 
we do not think that the case we present in our target article requires us to do this. 
14. When we speak, following Jonas, of modern science the intended contrast is with a 
pre-modern, Aristotelian conception of science, which conceives of the natural world as 
populated with irreducible intrinsic teleology. As we noted, an Aristotelian explanation 
of why rocks fall through air while fire rises proceeds by attributing a natural telos to 
these entities, so that rocks strive to be close to the earth while fire strives for the 
heavens. We also noted that the unacceptability of such an explanation by the standards 
of modern science is not due to the choice of particular elements in this theory, or with 
the particular telos that characterizes each of them. Rather, it is with attributing 
irreducible natural purposes to entities in our explanation; that is, purposes that receive 
no further explanation in terms of structure, function or dynamics. Above, we left the 
question of whether enactivism might, in future, provide such a further explanation 
open. But we also claimed that enactivists like Varela (Weber & Varela 2001), Di Paolo 
(2005) and Evan Thompson (2007) do not see the provision of such explanations as 
their task. When autopoietic or adaptive dynamics are identified with immanent 
purposiveness by such enactivists, this is not because an explanation of the emergence 
of natural purposes from non-teleological dynamics has been given. Rather, JI has been 
employed to allow us to understand the relevant dynamics as already imbued with 
teleology. 
15. We find it difficult to add much more to this by way of explaining the 
incompatibility between modern science and the acceptance of intrinsic natural purpose, 
or immanent teleology, that is the result of JI. This is because we agree with Jonas’s 
assessment that this rejection is not an empirical result obtained by science, but rather a 
methodological presupposition that demarcates the boundaries of scientific inquiry. This 
is why mainstream philosophy of cognitive science has been preoccupied for the last 
fifty years by trying (and failing) to provide reductive explanations of teleological 
properties of mental states in terms of structural and functional properties. Examples 
include Fred Dretske’s (e.g., 1981) information-theoretic theory of content and Ruth 
Millikan’s (e.g., 1984) teleosemantics. A genuinely naturalistic explanation of 
teleological phenomena, such thinkers believe, must explain them in terms of non-
teleological states, structurally and functionally construed. Above, we have tried to 
clarify that enactivism’s endorsement of JI absolves enactivism of the responsibility for 
providing such further explanations, and it is this that puts it in tension with modern 
scientific method. 
16. However, is this not to ignore the very fact that our target article is supposed to 
concern: that enactivism frequently presents itself as a new paradigm for cognitive 
science? As Taguchi and Torrance rightly point out, a belief in the need for the 
reciprocal circulation of ideas between phenomenology and cognitive science is one of 
the founding principles of enactivism. So is the conception of cognitive science and its 
methodology just sketched, where we aspire to reductively explain every 
phenomenological property or structure in terms of structure, function or dynamics, not 
just what enactivism has always sought to rid us of? We agree that we did not say 
enough about enactivism’s commitment to a reciprocal interplay between 
phenomenology and cognitive science in our original target article. Similarly, when we 
presented the quotes from Weber and Varela, Di Paolo and Thompson above, we did 
not mention that each of them occurs in the context of the authors stressing the need for 
a dialogue between phenomenology and cognitive science. The way we have presented 
things in our target article and in this response has so far been in terms of an opposition 
between science, which begins with structure, function, and dynamics and attempts to 
explain further properties and phenomena in these terms, and phenomenology, which 
begins with our lived experience and invites us to view the material world in these 
terms. But is the appeal of enactivism as a paradigm not supposed to lie in its showing 
us a middle way between these two extremes? 
17. Once again, we cannot attempt to fully address this important issue here (nor do we 
know how to do so). But we think that considering the nature of the interplay between 
phenomenology and cognitive science, and the delicate task of reconciling the 
methodological commitments of each, is where the enactive community should focus its 
efforts. Here is one way we can restate the central claim of our target article in light of 
this: contemporary enactivism’s conception of the relationship between phenomenology 
and cognitive science is not sufficiently reciprocal. As we see it, phenomenology is 
calling the shots in this relationship in a problematic way. In endorsing JI, 
contemporary enactivism begins with our own experience, then demands that the 
structural, functional and dynamical properties that are the explanatory materials of 
cognitive science be reconstrued in its terms. Consider an alternative relationship, 
where science calls the shots. Science would begin with non-sentient and non-
teleological structures and processes, then demand that the subject matter of 
phenomenology be reconceived in these terms. Instead of taking our experience of 
teleology at face value and reconceiving the material world in light of this, we would be 
guided by science’s non-sentient, non-teleological conception of material reality, and 
conclude that our experience of teleology and subjectivity is illusory. This conception 
of the priority of scientific understanding is incompatible with a genuinely reciprocal 
relationship between cognitive science and phenomenology. Likewise, we think that in 
relying on JI, contemporary enactivists commit themselves to a conception of the 
priority of phenomenological understanding that is incompatible with the reciprocal 
relationship between phenomenology and cognitive science at which enactivism 
originally aimed. 
Commented [a1]: redundant? 
18. There are many other important, insightful and interesting points in the 
commentaries on our target article that we have not been able to address here. We 
apologise for this, and hope to take up some of these issues in future work. Nonetheless, 
we hope this response has served to clarify the most important points we wanted to 
make in our target article, and that it will motivate some readers to take up the 
challenges we have tried to pose for enactivism.  
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